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LOOKING OUT FOR MARY CARTER: COLLUSIVE
SETTLEMENT AGREEMENTS IN WASHINGTON TORT
LITIGATION
J. Michael Philips
Abstract: Courts and commentators disagree as to the propriety of Mary Carter
agreements, pseudo-settlement devices used in multiparty litigation that unite the interests of a
plaintiff and a cooperating defendant, and maintain that defendant's presence at trial. Most
courts tolerate these arrangements provided that they are disclosed, while a distinct minority
render them void. Washington courts have not espoused a definite position, although recent
decisions suggest a tolerant stance. This Comment argues that the use of Mary Carters is
inconsistent with Washington tort law, and that Washington courts should therefore prohibit
them entirely. This may be accomplished by treating all Mary Carters as final settlements of a
plaintiff's claim against an agreeing defendant and requiring dismissal of that defendant, an
approach suggested by the nature of the agreements themselves.

Driving home from work one day, Alice was unfortunately caught in
the path of Bill, an individual who drove with the slightest of care, and
worse, the slightest of insurance coverage. Alice was severely injured
when the slightly intoxicated Bill lost control of his speeding auto,
crossed the center line, and collided with Alice. Aware that Bill's
insurance coverage would fail to fully compensate her, Alice chose to
sue both Bill and the city, claiming negligence in the construction of the
road due to the city's failure to build a solid median structure. To hedge
her bets, and to increase the chances of a judgment against the city, Alice
entered an agreement with Bill, in which Bill guaranteed Alice recovery
to the extent of his insurance coverage regardless of the outcome at trial.
In return, Alice promised not to collect from Bill in the event that she
was able to recover an amount in excess of Bill's coverage from the city.
Moreover, under the agreement Bill was required to remain a defendant
in the action.
Alice was thus able to buy an ally at trial, as both she and Bill would
benefit from a large judgment against the city.
Bill viewed the
agreement as an opportunity to escape as much blame and consequent
liability as possible, and enthusiastically developed a story to the effect
that it was faulty highway design that caused him to lose control of his
car. The result was that the two exploited the trial process, improperly
influenced the jury, and secured an enhanced finding of fault against the
"deep-pocket" city. And the device making it all possible was the Mary
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Carter agreement,' a controversial pseudo-settlement tool that in many
cases has become a powerful plaintiff's weapon.2
Debate has raged for years over the validity of such agreements. The
potential variations on the basic agreement are infinite,3 and jurisdictions
have adopted individual approaches in response to various forms. The
important features, however, embodied in most Mary Carters are: 1) that
the settling defendant retains a financial stake in the plaintiff's recovery,
and 2) that the settling defendant remains a nominal defendant at trial.4
Because of their tendency to alter traditional aspects of the trial
process, Mary Carter agreements have received naixed reviews from
courts and commentators. Much of the debate focuses on whether
adopting procedures to prevent them from remaining secret is sufficient
to ensure trial fairness. The majority of courts argue that while these
agreements might threaten trial fairness, they are tolerable if completely
disclosed to the court and non-agreeing parties.5
Although Washington courts have yet to definitively establish a
position, the recent case of McCluskey v. Handorf-Sherman6 suggests
that they lean toward the majority view. If Washington courts fully
adopt this position in the future, the implications will be critical,
particularly for deep-pocket defendants who often become targets of

1. The name comes from Booth v. Mary Carter Paint Co., 202 So. 2d 8 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1967).
The agreements are occasionally known by different names. See June F. Entman, Mary Carter
Agreements: An Assessment ofAttempted Solutions, 38 U. Fla. L. Rev. 521, 522 n.1 (1986).
2. This hypothetical is based loosely on the case of MeCluskey v. Iandorff-Sherman, 68 Wash.
App. 96, 841 P.2d 1300 (1992), review granted, 121 Wash. 2d 1021, 854 P.2d 1084 (June 9, 1993).
In McCluskey, the existence of an agreement was never established. Nevertheless, the case
presented an ideal opportunity for the use of a Mary Carter agreement. McCluskey was different in
that the defendant was insolvent and lacked insurance altogether. In such a situation, the Mary
Carter agreement would be equally effective. While it would not guarantee any amount from Bill
(B) to Alice (A), A and B would still contract to work together at trial tD foist maximum liability on
the city (C). The incentives for A, as in the hypothetical, are obvious. B, although insolvent, might
still be encouraged to cooperate if A promises to place all blame upon C and not to enforce
judgment; thus, B has a chance to escape much, if not all, responsibility for the accident.
3. Maule Indus., Inc. v. Rountree, 264 So. 2d 445, 447 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1972), rev'd on other
grounds, 284 So. 2d 389 (Fla. 1973).
4. Elbaor v. Smith, 845 S.W.2d 240, 247 (Fex. 1992). As discussed, Mary Carters may vary.
This Comment discusses only those agreements containing these two major elements.
5. See Entman, supranote 1, at 530.
6. 68 Wash. App. 96, 841 P.2d 1300 (1992), review granted, 121 Wash. 2d 1021, 854 P.2d 1084
(June 9, 1993). Washington courts have previously confronted agreements that may be classified
under the general definition of Mary Carter agreements. See infra note 47 and accompanying text.

Mary Carter Agreements in Washington
personal injury litigation.7 Because Mary Carter agreements can
influence determinations of proportionate fault,8 their use in Washington
courts-which determine liability on a "pure" comparative basis--could
inflate the liability of non-agreeing defendants. As a result, Mary Carters
conflict with Tort Reform laws enacted in Washington that were
designed at least in part to protect deep-pocket defendants from bearing
more than their fair share of liability.
Part I of this Comment examines Mary Carter agreements in depth,
analyzing the split in authority concerning their validity, and their status
under existing Washington tort law. Part II develops the implications of
such an agreement in a typical litigation setting under Washington tort
law. Part m concludes that Washington courts should render Mary
Carters void by treating them as final settlements of the plaintiff's claim
against the agreeing defendant and dismissing that defendant from trial.
This approach properly serves the legislative goals underlying the
Washington Tort Reform Act and comports with basic legal principles
requiring a justiciable issue among adversarial parties.
I.

OVERVIEW OF MARY CARTER AGREEMENTS

A.

Details of a Mary CarterAgreement

The key elements of a Mary Carter agreement are a limitation of the
settling defendant's liability, a requirement that that defendant remain in
the trial, and a guarantee of a certain sum of money to the plaintiff.10 A
typical Mary Carter agreement might contain several additional
provisions. For example, the plaintiff might be prohibited from settling
with non-agreeing defendants for an amount less than the guaranteed
amount without the agreeing defendant's consent.1
The agreement

7. See Cornelius J. Peck, Washington's PartialRejection and Modification of the Common Law
Rule of Joint and Several Liability, 62 Wash. L. Rev. 233, 238 (1987) [hereinafter Peck, Rejection
andModification].
8. See, e.g., John E. Benedict, Note, It's a Mistake to Tolerate the Mary Carter Agreement, 87
Colum. L. Rev. 368, 374-75 (1987); Entman, supra note 1, at 574.
9. See infra note 73 and accompanying text. A "pure" comparative negligence system is one in
which a plaintiff's contributory negligence serves to reduce his or her damages in proportion to his
or her fault; all defendants are liable to the plaintiff for their respective shares of the loss, even
though they may be less negligent than the plaintiff. W. Page Keeton et al., Prosserand Keeton on
the Law of Torts § 67, at 471-72 (5th ed. 1984); see Wash. Rev. Code § 4.22.070 (1993).
10. Elbaor v. Smith, 845 S.W.2d 240, 247 (Tex. 1992).
11. See Entman, supra note 1, at 524-25.
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might even explicitly urge a verdict exceeding the guaranteed amount."
Further, it might require that the parties conceal the agreement not only
from the jury, but also from the court and other parties. 3 This secrecy
has been a focus of controversy,
with most, if not all, courts requiring
'4
disclosure of the agreement.
Specific provisions regarding the guaranteed payment might also vary.
For example, rather than guarantee a payment, the defendant might loan
the funds to the plaintiff under a variation known as a "loan receipt"
agreement. 5 While the terminology differs, the essential premise is the
same: the settling defendant guarantees recovery to the plaintiff of a
specified amount. Whether funds actually change hands prior to trial and
judgment or whether the transfer is purely on paper makes little
16
difference.
Such an arrangement has significant effects on t.e parties' conduct at
trial. In its recent decision to ban Mary Carters, the Texas Supreme
Court remarked that these agreements create a substantial interest for the
defendant in a sizable plaintiff's recovery, and therefore encourage that
defendant to assist the plaintiff at trial in any manner possible. 7 Settling
defendants are thus pressured to cooperate with the plaintiff in discovery,
peremptory challenges, trial tactics, witness examination, and influencing
18
the jury
B.

JudicialTreatment of Mary Carters: Generally

While debate continues over whether trial processes will be unfairly
distorted, most authorities accept that Mary Carters skew the parties'
interests. A key problem acknowledged by courts and commentators on
both sides of the issue is how to overcome secrecy. 9 Even those courts
12. See, e.g., Lur v. Stinnet, 488 P.2d 347,348 (Nev.1971).
13. See, e.g., Booth v. Mary Carter Paint Co., 202 So. 2d 8, 10 (Fla. Dist. Ct App. 1967).
14. See Benedict, supra note 8, at 370.
15. See, e.g., Meriwether D. Williams, Comment, Blending Mary Carter'sColors: A Tainted
Covenant, 12 Gonz. L. Rev. 266, 268 (1977). A "loan receipe' agreement provides for payment
prior to judgment, with reimbursement made later, rather than a mere guarantee of payment with
later reduction.
16. However, whether there is actual payment might be important to a court attempting to
determine the true nature of the agreement. See infra note 123.
17. Elbaor v. Smith, 845 S.W.2d 240, 247 (Tex. 1992).
18. Id. at 249 (citing Benedict, supra note 8, at 372-73).
19. "The chief problem associated with a Mary Carter agreement is that a hidden alteration of the
relationship of some of the parties will give the jury a misleading and incomplete basis for
evaluating the evidence." Id. at 254 (Doggett, J., dissenting).

Mary Carter Agreements in Washington
that tolerate Mary Carters recognize the potential for trial misconduct
when the agreeing parties assist each other to the complete bewilderment
of the court, other defendants, and the jury. This problem may or may
not be controllable through various disclosure and instructional devices,
and the sufficiency of such measures is a major issue dividing those
courts that tolerate Mary Carters from those that prohibit them.
1.

The Majority View

The vast majority of states allow Mary Carter agreements if trial
courts implement procedural safeguards to overcome secrecy.2" As long
as a Mary Carter is disclosed to the court and opposing parties prior to
trial, these courts are satisfied that the nonsettling parties will not be
surprised or unfairly disadvantaged. Additionally, when the court is
aware of the agreement, it may consult the parties on how best to instruct
the jury concerning the arrangement and the true interests of the parties.
Once instructed, the jury is said to be able to properly judge the
credibility of witnesses.2
Some courts have developed specific procedures to eliminate bias that
may result from collusive or abnormal conduct of the agreeing
defendants. In Elbaor v. Smith," for example, the trial court gave the
non-agreeing defendant the same number of peremptory challenges as
the plaintiff and settling defendants combined, denied the settling parties
the customary right of an opponent to lead opposing witnesses, and
changed the order of presentation to guarantee that the non-agreeing
defendant always had the final opportunity to present evidence and
examine witnesses. By balancing procedural advantages, these courts
hope to overcome the shifting alliances created by a Mary Carter
agreement that might unfairly skew the trial process.'

20. Id. at 256 (Doggett, J., dissenting).
21. See, e.g., General Motors Corp. v. Lahocki, 410 A.2d 1039, 1046 (Md. 1980).
22. Elbaor,845 S.W.2d at 255 (Doggett, J.,
dissenting).
23. Id. at 254-55 (Doggett, J., dissenting). The maintenance of Mary Carters in the face of
various challenges is attributable to what some courts refer to as the "salutary effects" of these
agreements. See Reese v. Chicago, B. & Q. R.R., 303 N.E.2d 382, 386 (1l. 1973) (holding that a
loan receipt agreement was beneficial in that it meant funds would be more readily available to an
injured plaintiff, and that private settlement would be facilitated). While the justification of
encouraging settlement has been adopted by several courts, this line of reasoning has recently been
attacked as short-sighted because these agreements encourage only partial settlements. See infra
note 27.
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Minority Position

A clear minority of jurisdictions have elected to ban Mary Carter
agreements or to render them entirely ineffective."' In a major recent
case, the Texas Supreme Court determined that these arrangements skew
the trial process, mislead the jury, promote unethical collusion between
nominal adversaries, and create the likelihood that a less culpable
defendant will be hit with the full amount of any judgment." The court
concluded that the agreements and their effects are therefore inimical to
the adversary system.2 6 The court further noted that such agreements do
not promote settlement, but rather provide only partial settlement,
ensuring that the plaintiff will go to trial against the remaining defendant
to obtain high damages.27
Based on these concerns, the Texas court denounced Mary Carters as
completely incompatible with a system of fair trials, despite measures
designed to mitigate harmful effects.28 The court found such remedial
measures insufficient to overcome the harm caused by collusion between
the settling parties when the defendant retained a substantial financial
interest in the plaintiff's recovery.29 The court reasoned that its policy of
24. Only Texas, Nevada, Oklahoma, and Wisconsin have banned the use of Mary Carter
agreements. See Elbaor, 845 S.W.2d at 250 n.21. Some argue that Wisconsin, in Trampe v.
Wisconsin Tel. Co., 252 N.W. 675 (Wis. 1934), banned only secret Mary Carter agreements. See
Elbaor,845 S.W.2d at 256 (Doggett, J., dissenting).
25. Elbaor,845 S.W.2d at 250.
26. Id. at 248 (citing Scurlock Oil Co. v. Smithwick, 724 S.W.2d 1, 8 (Tex. 1986) (Spears, J.,
concurring)).
27. Id. at 248-49. The existence of a settlement "veto" power in the hands of the settling
defendant makes settlement with the remaining defendant even less likely, as the settling defendant
is unlikely to approve of any settlement which defeats reimbursement of the guaranteed amount.
28. The trial judge, aware of the potential bias against the non-settling doctor, undertook various
remedial measures to mitigate any harmful effects. See supra note 22 and accompanying text.
Despite these provisions, the court noted an extremely abnormal effect on the parties' conduct.
Elbaor,845 S.W.2d at 246-47. The court discussed the ways in which a settling defendant might
assist the plaintiff, including cooperating in discovery, peremptory challenges, trial tactics,
supportive witness examination, and influencing the jury. Id. at 249 (citing Benedict, supra note 8,
at 372-73 (detailing the tactical and procedural advantages that cooperating parties enjoy)).
29. Elboar,845 S.W.2d at 250. Earlier, in Scurlock Oil v. Smithwick, 724 S.W.2d 1 (Tex. 1986)
(Spears, J., concurring), Justice Spears argued that disclosure provision:; are insufficient to overcome
unfairness, because it would be difficult for jurors, already unfamiliar with trial procedure and
practice, to fully grasp the implications of the relationship between the settling parties created by the
Mary Carter agreement. Id. at 11. To illustrate the problem, Spears referred to a companion case
arising from the same accident as Scurlock Oil and containing identi.al facts, Missouri Pacific v.
Huebner, 704 S.W.2d 353 (Tex. Ct. App. 1985). The outcome in Missouri Pacific was virtually
opposite from the jury findings in Scurlock Oil. Scurlock Oil, 724 S.W.2d at 11. In Scurlock Oil,
the jury found the Mary Carter defendant (Mo-Pac) not negligent and the non-settling defendant

Mary Carter Agreements in Washington
favoring fair trials far outweighed any policy favoring partial
settlements.30
Texas is not alone in its rejection of Mary Carters. In a much earlier
decision, the Nevada Supreme Court, in Lum v. Stinnett,31 declared Mary
Carter agreements void as against public policy. The court determined
that remedial measures such as disclosure to the jury are not only
inadequate, but might present additional problems such as unwarranted
jury bias.32 While it confessed to being unsure of the effects such an
agreement might actually have on the jury, the court argued that
defendants have the right to litigate without the risk that a Mary Carter
might affect a jury's verdict.33
As an alternative to outright banning, Oklahoma adopted a somewhat
novel approach to Mary Carter agreements. In Cox v. Kelsey-Hayes
Co.,34 the Oklahoma Supreme Court recognized that Mary Carters
deprive a trial of its adversarial nature, and that the more culpable
defendant usually avoids liability through them. 5 The court therefore
required trial courts to adopt one of two alternative approaches: either
dismiss the agreeing defendant prior to trial or prohibit the portion of the
agreement granting the defendant an interest in a large plaintiff's
recovery. 6 The court reasoned that if the settling defendant is dismissed
and subsequently appears as a witness, cross-examination regarding the
defendant's interests and credibility will sufficiently protect the nonsettling defendant's interests.37 Alternatively, allowing the settling
defendant to remain in the suit but voiding the reimbursement provision

(Scurlock) 100 percent negligent; in Huebner,where Mo-Pac did not enter a settlement agreement, it
was found 90 percent negligent and Scurlock only 10 percent negligent. Id. The concurring justice
reasoned that "[o]nly the Mary Carter agreement can account for these variations in the juries'
findings." Id.
30. Elbaor,845 SAV.2d at 250.
31. Lum v. Stinnett, 488 P.2d 347 (Nev. 1971) (banning Mary Carters because they violate
policies against champerty and maintenance, violate rules of professional ethics, and are "inimical to
true adversary process," thus preventing fair trial). For a detailed examination of this case, see
Entman, supra note 1, at 531-40.
32. Lum, 488 P.2d at 352-53.
33. Id.
34. 594 P.2d 354 (Okla. 1978).
35. Id. at 359.
36. Id. ("In no circumstances should a defendant who will profit from a large plaintiff's verdict be
allowed to remain in the suit as an ostensible defendant.").
37. Id.
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will preserve the adversarial nature of the proceedings and make the
agreement irrelevant."
Although the Cox court required the defendant's dismissal, it did not
elect to view Mary Carters in general as settlements. In fact, the court
commented that Mary Carter-type agreements cannot be classified as
settlements because the controversy is only contingently settled.39 The
agreeing defendant remains a party, and the jury still determines the
extent of his or her liability.4"
In contrast to Oklahoma's conclusion that Mary Carters are not
settlements, the Maryland Supreme Court, in GeneralMotors Corp. v.
Lahocki,41 did view a Mary Carter-type arrangement as a settlement.
Citing nineteenth century precedent, the court stressed that the very
essence of compromise involves the waiver of preexisting claims in favor
of a right or claim fixed by a new agreement. 42 The court reasoned that
because the defendant limits the extent of its liability and guarantees a
sum to the plaintiff through a Mary Carter, such arrangements are
essentially settlements.43 The court therefore determined that disclosure
to the trial court was necessary. 44 It did not, however, consider the
propriety of dismissing the defendant, apparently because the nonagreeing defendant in the case had not requested dismissal. 45 This
treatment suggests that the court considered Mary Carters acceptable if
disclosed, indicating compliance with the majority view.
C.

Mary Carters Under Washington Law

1.

Judicial Treatment ofMary Carters

Consideration of Mary Carter arrangements by Washington courts has
been extremely limited. A few cases, while not specifically referring to
"Mary Carters," have dealt with similar arrangements. Only two cases
have actually used the term "Mary Carter," and only one of these was
decided since 1986, when the legislature amended laws governing
38. Id. at 359-60.
39. Id. at 358.
40. Id.
41. 410 A.2d 1039 (Md. 1980).
42. Id. at 1044 (citing St. John's College v. Purnell, 23 Md. 629, 640-41 (1865)).
43. See id.
44. The court held that disclosure was necessary because "in judging the credibility of a witness,
the jury is entitled to know of his interest in the outcome" of the trial. Id. at 1046.
45. See id.

Mary Carter Agreements in Washington
determinations of fault. 6 Indications are that Washington courts lean
toward allowing these arrangements if fully disclosed.
In Monjay v. Evergreen School District,47 an appellate court
confronted a Mary Carter-like arrangement that it called a "loan
agreement." The contract guaranteed a recovery amount to the plaintiff,
who agreed to reimburse the settling defendant in the event of judgment
against the non-settling party.48 The settling party did not, however,
remain at trial as a defendant; instead, the plaintiff agreed not to sue that
party.49 Troubled primarily by the guarantee clause of the arrangement,
the court declared only that portion void. It held that such a provision
was repugnant to the principle of pro tanto reduction attendant to the
covenant not to sue,5 ° and was potentially coercive because it forced the
non-settling defendant, whose responsibility for injury might be
questionable or unclear, to either
litigate or settle, thereby compelling
51
defendant.
that
from
contribution
Ten years later, the same court overruled this holding in Jensen v.
Beaird.5 2 Attacking the reasoning in Monjay, the court joined the
majority of states by lending its approval to Mary Carter-type
settlements. 3 The court specifically rejected the lower court's reliance

46. These cases are McCluskey v. Handorff-Sherman, 68 Wash. App. 96, 841 P.2d 1300 (1992),
review granted, 121 Wash. 2d 1021, 854 P.2d 1084 (June 9, 1993), and Giambattista v. National
Bank of Commerce, 21 Wash. App. 723, 586 P.2d 1180 (1978). The Giambattistacourt referred to
Mary Carters only in passing, holding that the agreement in question did not fall within such a
category. Id. at 735 n.5, 586 P.2d at 1187 n.5; see supra note 9.
47. 13 Wash. App. 654,537 P.2d 825 (1975), review denied, 85 Wash. 2d 1017 (1975).
48. Id. at 658.
49. Id. at 655. See Williams, supranote 15, at 273-74.
50. Pro tanto reduction, whereby the plaintiff's total recovery against remaining defendants is
reduced by the amount of settlement, was in use in Washington at the time of Monjay. The 1986
Tort Reform Act has rejected this principle in favor of a comparative reduction system in the case of
joint tortfeasors. See infra notes 74-80 and accompanying text.
51. Monjay, 13 Wash. App. at 660-61,537 P.2d at 829. The court also expressed concern that the
agreement was champertous. Id. at 661, 537 P.2d at 830. Cf. Lur v. Stinnet, 488 P.2d 347 (Nev.
1971). Champerty is a disfavored practice in which a stranger to a suit agrees with a party to carry
on the litigation at his or her own cost and risk, in consideration of receiving, if successful, a part of
the proceeds or subject sought to be recovered. Black's Law Dictionary231 (6th ed. 1990).
52. 40 Wash. App. 1, 696 P.2d 612 (1985), review denied, 103 Wash. 2d 1038 (1985). The
agreement at issue in Jensen consisted of a covenant by the plaintiff not to execute any judgment
against the settling defendant in exchange for $110,000.
Note a critical difference from
Monjay-the agreeing defendant in Jensen remained a party at trial.
53. Id. at 10, 696 P.2d at 618.
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on Monjay,54 concluding that loan agreements violate neither the pro
tanto reduction principle nor any other public policy."5
The Jensen court concluded that a loan agreement did not involve an
actual payment in settlement of the plaintiff's claim. 6 While a loan
might deprive the remaining tortfeasor of a reduction in any judgment
against it, this would not violate pro tanto reduction principles. The
court suggested that Monjay confused the pro tanto principle with
prohibitions against contribution. 7 In any event, it held that rules
barring contribution were not violated, even though the settling
defendant might therefore obtain indemnification to which it otherwise
would not be entitled. The court reasoned that the: principle objection
behind the no-contribution doctrine-that the courts should not be used
for the relief of wrongdoers-was absent in this case because the
'
agreement was indirect, private, and "out of court."58
The Jensen court also noted certain salutory effects of a loan
agreement, including that such agreements encourage private settlement,
make funds immediately available to injured persons, and simplify
complex multiparty litigation.59 The court further di.smissed the Monjay
arguments that loan agreements were coercive, reasoning that disclosure
and limiting instructions can alleviate any collusive or abnormal
effects.60 In rejecting any argument that such agreements undermine the
adversarial nature of trial or produce coercive effects, the court rather
summarily cited "the great weight of authority." It relied on the notion
that the law does not require that codefendants be friendly."
However, while Jensen thus dismissed Monjay and suggested that
Mary Carters might be acceptable in Washington, it was decided prior to
tort reform. While its analysis indicates how Washington courts may act,

54. The trial court found that the agreement violated pro tanto reduction in that it resulted in
indemnity or contribution for the settling defendant to which it otherwise would not have been
entitled. Id. at 6-7, 696 P.2d at 616.
55. Id. at 7, 696 P.2d at 617.
56. Id. at 9, 696 P.2d at 618.
57. Id. at 10, 696 P.2d at 618.
58. Id. (citing Reese v. Chicago, B.& Q. R.R., 303 N.E.2d 382,386 (111. 1973)).
59. Id. citing Reese, 303 N.E.2d at 386.
60. Id. at 11-12, 696 P.2d at 619. This dismissal of the Monjay argument appears to have missed
the point. In Monjay, the agreeing defendant clearly was not required to remain at trial. The Monjay
court discussed the coercive potential of the agreement as forcing a non-agreeing defendant to either
litigate or settle; it did not deal with the collusive effects of a plaintiff and cooperative defendant
aligned at trial. See Monjay, 13 Wash. App. at 661, 537 P.2d at 829.
61. Jensen, 40 Wash. App. at 12,696 P.2d at 619.

Mary Carter Agreements in Washington
the changes wrought by tort reform call its continuing validity into
question.
In the one case discussing Mary Carters after tort reform, McCluskey
v. Handorff-Sherman,the Washington Court of Appeals did not reach the
issue of the validity of Mary Carters, due to a lack of evidence that such
an agreement actually existed.62 In dictum, however, the court cited
cases from other states for the proposition that secret agreements might
prejudice a trier of fact and that pretrial disclosure is therefore
necessary.6 3 Those cases suggest that through disclosure, the jury will be
able to sufficiently consider the parties' relationships in evaluating
evidence and the credibility of witnesses.' The implication is therefore
that Washington courts might uphold disclosed Mary Carter agreements
even under modem tort law.
On the other hand, Washington courts have given no indication as to
whether Mary Carter agreements will be viewed as settlements.
However, they have concluded that a similar device-a straight
"covenant not to execute' 6 5-will be. In Shelby v. Keck, the Washington
Supreme Court held that such a covenant made dismissal of the agreeing
defendant appropriate.66 The arrangement set the upper limit of the
defendant's liability. The court reasoned that once the plaintiff accepted
the funds, the plaintiff was protected in the event that the jury held
against that defendant for a lower amount.67 The court held that the
covenant was a settlement because it left no justiciable issue between the
parties; dismissal was proper
despite the plaintiff's objection that the
68
agreement did not call for it.

62. 68 Wash. App. 96, 841 P.2d 1300 (1992), review granted,121 Wash. 2d 1021, 854 P.2d 1084
(June 9, 1993).
63. Id. at 103-04, 841 P.2d at 1304-05.
64. Id. (citing Daniel v. Penrod, 393 F. Supp. 1056 (E.D. La. 1975); Ward v. Ochoa, 284 So. 2d
385 (Fla. 1973); Maule v. Rountree, 284 So. 2d 389 (Fla. 1973); Ratterree v. Bartlett, 707 P.2d 1063
(Kan. 1985)).
65 "In a covenant not to execute, the defendant's liability is limited to an agreed sum regardless
of the judgment amount." Sara Connelly, Note, Loan Agreements as Settlement Devices, 25 DePaul
L. Rev. 792,795 (1976).
66. 85 Wash. 2d 91,918,541 P.2d 365, 370 (1975).
67. Id.
68. Id.
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Backgroundon 1986 Tort Reform

Washington began moving away from traditional common law
principles of fault determination in its 1973 legislation adopting a system
of "pure" comparative negligence, with the purpose of facilitating
recovery by injured persons and thereby serving the compensatory
function of tort law.69 The Washington Supreme Court later rejected
pleas to abandon joint and several liability, holding that comparative
negligence did not necessitate such an action, and that abandoning joint
and several liability would only frustrate the goal of compensation.
Fairness among tortfeasors was deemed subordinate to the goal of
fairness to the injured party.71 In 1981, the legislature established
contribution among joint or concurrent tortfeasors to mitigate any
"unfairness" to defendants who may have been compelled to pay more
than their proportionate share of damages.72
In 1986, the Washington Legislature modified the state's tort system
and, in particular, substantively changed rules regulating joint and
several liability. The legislature adopted a general rule of several
liability based on proportionate fault, with joint and several liability
restricted to a few specific situations. An example is when a plaintiff is
free from fault.73
69. See Peck, Rejection and Modification, supra note 7, at 235-39, for a detailed history of the
common law principles and their modification in Washington.
70. Seattle First Nat'l Bank v. Shoreline Concrete Co., 91 Wash. 2d 230, 236, 588 P.2d 1308,
1313 (1978); see also Peck, Rejection and Modification,supra note 7, at 237.
71. Id.
72. See Cornelius J. Peck, Reading Tea Leaves: The Future of Negotiationsfor Tort Claimants
FreeFrom Fault,15 U. Puget Sound L. Rev. 335, 337 (1992) [hereinafter Peek, Tea Leaves].
73. The Washington statute provides, in pertinent part:
(1) In all actions involving fault of more than one entity, [the trier of fact shall determine the
fault of each entity, with judgment entered against each defendant e:xcept those released by the
claimant,] in an amount which represents that party's proportionate share of the claimant's total
damages. The liability of each defendant shall be several only and shall not be joint except:

(b) If the trier of fact determines that the claimant or party suffering bodily injury or incurring
property damages was not at fault, the defendants against whom judgment is entered shall be
jointly and severally liable for the sum of their proportionate shares of the claimants total
damages.
(2) Ifa defendant is jointly and severally liable under one of the exceptions listed in subsections
(1)(a) or (1)(b) of this section, such defendant's rights to contribution against another jointly and
severally liable defendant, and the effect of settlement by eithei such defendant, shall be
determined under RCW [§§] 4.22.040, 4.22.050, and 4.22.060.
Wash. Rev. Code § 4.22.070 (1993).
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The 1986 law requires a trier of fact to allocate liability comparatively
among all entities causing damage, including the plaintiff,74 based on
each party's share of fault. The liability of each is to be several only,
except when the plaintiff is free of fault; in that case, the defendants are
jointly and severally liable for the sum of the shares of all parties against
whom judgment is entered.7' Thus, when a faultless plaintiff settles with
one defendant prior to judgment, the amount ofjoint and several liability
is reduced by whatever amount of fault the trier of fact later allocates to
that settling defendant.76 One effect of this provision is to require
faultless plaintiffs to exercise extreme caution in entering into any prejudgment settlement agreement.77
In cases in which a faultless plaintiff enters into a post-judgment
settlement with one of the joint tortfeasors, the effects of that settlement
are governed by section 4.22.060.78 That provision specifically lists any
release, covenant not to sue, covenant not to enforce judgment, or similar
agreement as a settlement within its scope.79 On the other hand, when
liability is several only, settlement appears to have no effect on the
liabilities of remaining tortfeasors.
II.

ANALYZING MARY CARTER AGREEMENTS IN
WASHINGTON

Much of the impact of Mary Carter agreements in a given jurisdiction
depends on how the jurisdiction in question handles contribution, joint
and several liability, and determinations of fault. A brief examination of
how a Mary Carter agreement might affect a typical personal injury suit
in Washington provides a better understanding of these agreements and
why they are incompatible with the purposes behind tort reform.

Note that joint and several liability is traditionally reserved for cases involving hazardous wastes,
tortious interference with contracts or business relations, and generic products. See, e.g., Peck, Tea
Leaves, supra note 72, at 341 n.24.
74. Wash. Rev. Code § 4.22.070(1).
75. Note that joint and several liability is also available in the separate context of concurrent
tortfeasors. See supranote 73.
76. For a detailed discussion of the intricacies of this system and criticism of its effects on
negotiation and claim settlement, see generally Peck, Rejection and Modification, supra note 7;
Peck, Tea Leaves, supranote 72.
77. See Peck, Tea Leaves, supranote 72, at 351.
78. Wash. Rev. Code § 4.22.070(2).
79. Wash. Rev. Code § 4.22.060.
80. See Peck, Tea Leaves, supranote 72, at 340 n.21.
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Application of a Mary CarterAgreement

The use of Mary Carter agreements in Washington will have a
This is
distinctly negative impact on deep-pocket defendants.
demonstrated by the simple automobile collision suit discussed at the
beginning of this Comment."
Where the plaintiff (A) is faultless, its advantages from a Mary Carter
agreement are clear. Washington law holds the defendants against whom
judgment is entered jointly and severally liable for the sum of their
proportionate shares of the claimant's total damages.8 2 Because the
settling defendant (B) is financially limited to its insurance coverage, any
judgment against B will be limited for purposes of actual recovery. By
making the city (C)-a typical "deep-pocket defendant"-a defendant,
and by agreeing with B to encourage the jury to allocate fault to the city,
A greatly increases chances for recovery of full damages,83 with C jointly
and severally liable for all damages.
In fact, A's and B's job of convincing the jury is made relatively easy,
because the city technically need be only 1 percent at fault to be
responsible for the entire amount of damages. Thus, an imaginative
plaintiff might concoct a multitude of arguments as to how a city
negligently constructed a road. A defendant in B's position will likely be
extremely willing to adopt a common argument, finding that his
recollection of the accident coincides quite closely with A's theory
against the city. While the story might otherwise fail, its chances for
success are greatly enhanced when the settling defendant cooperates.
Potentially huge liability in a myriad of injury situations is therefore
foisted onto states, municipalities, and other deep pockets by the
operation of a simple Mary Carter contract.
Nor does the defendant's right of contribution84 offer any consolation
to a deep-pocket defendant on the short end of an agreement. The
distortive effects of supposedly opposing parties' cooperative conduct on
a jury's fault determinations are well-chronicled.Y A jury might allocate

81. See supra note 1 and accompanying text.
82. Wash. Rev. Code § 4.22.070(1)(b); see supra note 76 and accompanying text.
83. See Wash. Rev. Code § 4.22.070(1)(b).
84. See Wash. Rev. Code § 4.22.070(2) (indicating that right to contribution is to be determined
according to sections 4.22.040-.060).
85. See supra note 25 and accompanying text. One commentator notes that the very nature of a
Mary Carter is deceit and fraud practiced by the contracting parties against the outside defendant.
Warren Freedman, The Expected Demise of "Mary Carter": She Never Was Well, 633 Ins. L.L 602,
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substantial fault to a city that is charged, for example, with negligence in
failing to construct a median barrier.86 The agreeing defendant's liability
will thus likely be lower, which means that contribution to the extent of
that liability will be substantially lower than in the absence of such an
agreement.8 ' Further, because the state bears the risk that other
tortfeasors will be unable to pay damages, it lacks recourse when the
agreeing defendant is insolvent.88
The potential for abuse of the trial process is substantial even when
the plaintiff is partially at fault, and the defendants' liabilities are
therefore several only. As discussed, the impact on the jury of
cooperative conduct between the settling parties may increase a nonsettling party's liability far beyond what it might have been absent the
agreement. A and B will work to decrease B's fault while attempting to
increase both the total damages and the outside defendant's
responsibility for them. 9 All defendants, deep-pocket or otherwise, are
thus exposed to unjustifiably high fault determinations when the plaintiff
and settling defendant coordinate their efforts against "them. As

604 (1975). The Scurlock concurrence describes the anomalous results reached in companion cases
based on the same accident and identical facts. See supra note 29.
86. In fact, the jury in McCluskey allocated 50 percent of the fault to the state and 50 percent of
the fault to the defendant driver who had been smoking marijuana and speeding at the time of the
accident. On appeal, the state noted indications of improper collaboration in the allegedly agreeing
parties' trial conduct, including the agreeing defendanVs (D1) failure to object to plaintiff's motions
in limine or to her damages, DI's agreement with plaintiff's jury challenges and selection, Dl's
targeting of the State as the responsible party, plaintiff's and DI's buttressing of each other's cases
through cross-examination of witnesses, and various other measures taken by the plaintiff to reduce
the liability ofDL. The court nevertheless held that such behavior was not sufficiently indicative of
a possible collaborative agreement to warrant further discovery. McCluskey v. Handorff-Sherman,
68 Wash. App. 96, 102-05, 841 P.2d 1300, 1304-05 (1992), review granted, 121 Wash. 2d 1021,
854 P.2d 1084 (June 9, 1993).
87. See Benedict, supra note 8, at 375 (arguing that as the focus of the parties is to try to increase
the non-settling defendant's liability, while decreasing that of the settling defendant, the non-settling
defendant is naturally likely to pay more than if there is no Mary Carter arrangement).
88. See Peck, Rejection and Modification,supranote 7, at 239. Another possibility might be that
the settling parties, nearing conclusion of the trial and confident of a high negligence finding against
the deep pocket, agree to drop the settling party from the suit. This will cost the plaintiff the chance
of joint and several liability, but will save the settling defendant any risk of contribution. When the
settling party's negligence is found to be low anyway, this may be a viable part of a creative
agreement. See generallyEntman, supra note 1, at 545-46.
89. For a discussion of the attractiveness of Mary Carters in comparative contribution
jurisdictions, see Benedict, supra note 8, at 375-76 ("Mhe settling defendant's negligence only
reduces the plaintiff's recovery by the percentage of fault attributable to him. The settling parties
attempt to decrease the settling defendant's percentage of liability, while increasing both the total
judgment and the nonsettling defendant's percentage of fault.").
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contribution is not allowed when liability is several only," the agreeing
parties need not concern themselves with the possibility of the outside
defendant seeking reimbursement from B.
B.

Mary CarterAgreements Frustratethe PurposesBehind 1986 Tort
Reform

Because Mary Carter agreements have the potential to unduly
influence the jury and thereby to thrust excessive liability onto a deeppocket defendant, such agreements frustrate the purposes of the
Washington Legislature's modification of joint and several liability
under the 1986 Tort Reform Act.91 The preamble to the 1986
modification states that the reforms were enacted to create a more
equitable distribution of the cost and risk of injury and to increase the
availability and affordability of insurance.9' The aim is to reduce costs
associated with the tort system while providing "adequate and
appropriate" compensation to injured parties.93 Because of their capacity
to greatly inflate or even create the non-settling defendant's share of
responsibility for injury, Mary Carter agreements defeat these purposes.
The possibility of inflated allocations of fault based on the cooperative
and manipulative conduct of the agreeing parties, rather than on the true
facts of the case, frustrates the legislative goal of an equitable allocation
of the cost and risk of injury. Whether liability is joint or several, deeppocket defendants face drastically increased liability. Allocations of
fault in these cases are not "equitable," because they are the products of
jury influencing and strategic gamesmanship rather than legitimate factfinding.94 Recovery from the deep-pocket defendant is therefore not an
appropriate compensation, because it is not based on the true facts of the
case and does not accurately reflect the actual responsibilities for injury.

90. See supranote 73.
91. See id.
92. 1986 Wash. Laws 1354-55.
93. Id.
94. See Entman, supra note 1, at 574-75.
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III. TREATING MARY CARTER AGREEMENTS AS
SETTLEMENTS AND REQUIRING DISMISSAL OF THE
DEFENDANT IS A SOLUTION TO THE PROBLEM
The use of Mary Carter agreements is inconsistent with modem
Washington tort law. While the position of Washington courts is
unclear, the Jensen and McCluskey holdings have suggested that Mary

Carters are acceptable when tempered by prophylactic measures.95 A
better rule, however, would be to eliminate Mary Carters entirely.
First, the Jensen view is outdated and incorrect. Not only is its
reasoning inconsistent with the legislature's subsequent effort to curb
inflated deep-pocket liability, but the court also appears to have relied on

the reasoning of the majority of other jurisdictions without a thorough,
independent assessment of the true effects of a Mary Carter-type
agreement under Washington law. The court merely commented that the
majority of states' courts reject arguments that these arrangements
undermine the adversarial process or produce collusion, apparently
because there is no requirement that codefendants be friendly.96 The
evidence of the impact of cooperative conduct,97 however, demonstrates
that the problem goes beyond unfriendly codefendants. Washington
courts should therefore abandon Jensen's short-sighted approach.
A sounder and more logical approach to Mary Carter agreements is to
treat them as outright settlements between the agreeing parties, and to
require dismissal of the agreeing defendant. This alternative is
appropriate because the Mary Carter actually resolves the plaintiff's
claim against the defendant and eliminates all justiciable issues between
them. Further, this approach is consistent with the language and intent of
the 1986 Tort Reform Act. Finally, treating the agreements as
settlements best serves the principles of the adversarial process.
A.

Mary CarterAgreements Resolve the Plaintiff's Claim

The logistics of the parties' new relationship under a Mary Carter
agreement demonstrate that the agreements resolve the plaintiff's claim
against the agreeing defendant; therefore, courts should view the
agreements as settlements and dismiss the agreeing defendant. This

95. See supranotes 52-64 and accompanying text.
96. Jensen v. Beaird, 40 Wash. App. 1, 12, 696 P.2d 612, 619 (1985), review denied, 103 Wash.
2d 1038 (1985).
97. See supranote 25.
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conclusion is supported by the Washington Supreme Court's reasoning
in Shelby v. Keck. There, the court dismissed the agreeing defendant in a
covenant not to execute, due to the absence of a justiciable issue.98 A
covenant not to execute is virtually identical to a Mary Carter
agreement. 99 Under a Mary Carter agreement, the plaintiff and defendant
have also resolved the plaintiff's claim, completely replacing it with a
separate contractual relationship in which the defendant pays the agreed
sum and the plaintiff reimburses the defendant to the extent warranted by
the final judgment."° The trial serves only as the engine for the
contract's execution.
The Mary Carter agreement thereby eliminates any justiciable issue
between the plaintiff and the agreeing defendant. Although the agreeing
defendant retains an interest in the outcome of the litigation, this interest
is now tied to the jury's allocation of fault to the non-agreeing party; this
interest has no relationship to the plaintiff's original claim against the
agreeing defendant. Most importantly, the proceedings between the
plaintiff and settling defendant are no longer adversarial. Having settled
their differences, they are now working together to achieve a maximum
verdict against the non-agreeing party. There is a complete lack of
dispute over a now non-existent claim, between parties who are
nevertheless nominally opposed and treated as adversaries in the formal
trial structure.10 t
98. See supranote 66 and accompanying text.
99. The only real differences between Shelby's covenant not to execute and a Mary Carter are the
contractual ramifications for final payment or reimbursement amounts. Under a Mary Carter,
agreeing defendants effectively limit their liability to the agreed upon sum, just as in a covenant not
to execute. Mary Carters only differ to the extent that the defendant may or may not recover some or
all of its commitment, depending on the non-settling party's allocation ef fault; the plaintiff receives
the same security as in a covenant not to execute. More importantly, the defendant is effectively
receiving an unspoken covenant not to execute, because any judgment against it will be deemed
ineffective due to its contractual right. See generally Connelly, supra note 65, at 792; Benedict,
supra note 8, at 371 n.12 (labeling all Mary Carters covenants not to execute, as the plaintiff
promises not to enforce a court's judgment against the settling defendant). Note that many Mary
Carters contain an explicit covenant not to execute. See, e.g., Williams, supranote 15, at 268.
100. See General Motors Corp. v. Lahocki, 410 A.2d 1039, 1043-44 (Md. 1980); see also supra
note 1.
101. Cf Gatto v. Walgreen Drug Co., 337 N.E.2d 23, 29 (I11.1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 936
(1976) ("No 'justiciable matter' exists where two former adversary parties have settled their
differences as to all the issues they are purportedly litigating before the trial court." (emphasis
added)). See also Connelly, supranote 65, at 798-99 (arguing that the 5'atto holding "indicates that
once a loan agreement is executed, the signing defendant must be dismisssed from the action"); David
R. Miller, Comment, Mary Carter Agreements: Unfair and Unnece'sary, 32 Sw. L.J. 779, 800
(1978) ("Since no justiciable issue exists between the parties entering the Mary Carter agreement,
dismissing the settling defendant is appropriate."); Entman, supranote i, at 563, 564 n.241 (arguing
that if a Mary Carter is treated as valid and given full effect, there are no issues left to be tried on the
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Allowing the settling party to remain a defendant therefore presents
the court with a sham controversy. 2 The settling defendant effectively
circumvents Washington law forbidding contribution from remaining
defendants, 3 under the guise of adversity and within the auspices of a
formal trial designed to resolve adversarial disputes. Allowing a
defendant to remain nominally opposed to the plaintiff, while its only
interest concerns the non-settling defendant and the "contribution" it may
effectively receive from that defendant, is therefore utterly incompatible
with the traditional trial system. 4
B.

ConstruingMary CarterAgreements as Settlements Is Consistent
with the Language and Intent of the 1986 Tort Reform Act

1.

The Language of the Statute Indicates That Mary Carter-type
Agreements Constitute Settlements

The language of the 1986 Tort Reform Act and its interrelationship
with the "effects of settlement" statute"0 5 suggest that the legislature
intended Mary Carter-type agreements to be treated as settlements.

claim against the agreeing defendant, thus "demonstrat[ing] the absurdity of upholding the validity
of a Mary Carter agreement while still allowing the settling defendant to remain as a party
defendant").
102. Cf Gatto, 337 N.E.2d at 29 ("While [the Illinois Constitution] provides that 'Circuit Courts
shall have original jurisdiction of all justiciable matters' ... it does not confer jurisdiction to decide
sham controversies.").
103. A right to contribution among defendants is available only to defendants against whom
judgment has been entered. See supra note 77. Here, however, the settling defendant is clearly
seeking contribution towards its payment (or promise to pay) of the guaranteed amount. The Jensen
court remarked that it was not concerned with the potential for contribution between parties despite
prohibition of such a result, as the real objection to contribution-"se of the courts for relief of
wrongdoers"--was absent from what it called an "indirect, private out-of-court arrangement."
Jensen v. Beaird, 40 Wash. App. 1, 10, 696 P.2d 612, 618 (1985). In the hypothetical at hand,
however, where the only interest of the settling defendant involves what it will in fact receive from
the non-settling defendant as contribution, the court is being used for the relief of wrongdoers, and in
an underhanded manner at that. This result weighs in favor of banning Mary Carters, at least insofar
as they maintain the settling defendant's presence at trial. For a discussion of how Mary Carters
violate no contribution rules, see Entman, supranote 1, at 540-49.
104. Compare the Shelby court's reasoning for approving the lower court's dismissal of the
agreeing defendant: The plaintiff hoped to use certain pre-trial statements of the settling defendant,
and could do so only under the hearsay exception for party admissions. This was apparently the sole
purpose of maintaining the defendant's presence, and the lower court was deemed to be acting
within its discretion in dismissing the defendant "to avoid a possible misuse of the evidence by the
jury." Shelby v. Keck, 85 Wash. 2d 911,918, 541 P.2d 365, 370 (1975).
105. Wash. Rev. Code § 4.22.070, .060; see supranotes 74-81 and accompanying text.
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Section 4.22.060, the effects of settlement statute, specifically identifies
releases, covenants not to sue, covenants not to erforce judgment, or
similar agreements as settlements.'0 6 While this sect on is intended only
to come into effect in the case ofjoint and several liability, 10 7 which itself
only applies when there is judgment against the defendants,"0 8 it appears
by inference that the legislature also intended that when one of the listed
types of settlements is entered into before judgment, that settlement
would prevent judgment against the settling party, and thereby exclude
that party's damages from the amount of joint liability. A Mary Carter
agreement, effectively a pre-judgment covenant not to execute or enforce
judgment, should therefore be viewed as a settlement within this general
statutory definition of settlements. This will foil schemes designed to
achieve joint and several liability by keeping the settling parties in the
lawsuit." 9
In cases when liability is several only, the effects of settlement
statute110 does not apply; the language of the general. fault determination
statute"' nevertheless indicates the same legislative intent to treat Mary
Carter-type agreements as settlements. The statute specifically directs
that judgment shall be entered against all parties, except those released
by the claimant, or immune from liability, or prevailing on any other
defense."' While this section does not specifically list the types of
settlements considered releases, it can be inferred that a release is
intended to include those arrangements listed in the effects of settlement
statute.' 3 Further, at least one commentator argues that the fact that the
fault determination statute was amended in 1987 gives rise to an
inference that the two statutes cover the same general types of
agreements." 4 This suggests that a Mary Carter-type agreement would

106. See supra note 79 and accompanying text.
107. See, e.g., Washburn v. Beatt Equip. Co., 120 Wash. 2d 246, 840 P.2d 860 (1992) (when there
is no joint and several liability, § 4.22.070(2) does not apply, and thus does not direct that .040, .050,
or .060 is to be applied).
108. See supra note 75 and accompanying text. See also Peck, Tea Lmves, supranote 72, at 340.
109. See Peck, Tea Leaves, supranote 72, at 343-44.
110. Wash. Rev. Code § 4.22.060; see supra notes 73-80 and accompanying text.
111. Wash. Rev. Code § 4.22.070; see supra notes 73-80 and accompanying text.
112. Wash. Rev. Code § 4.22.070(1).
113. See Peck, Tea Leaves, supranote 72, at 344 (section .060 refers to "a release, covenant not to
sue, covenant not to enforce judgment, or similar agreement" as being "interchangeable" for the
purpose of determining the effect of settlement).
114. Id.
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be considered by the legislature to be a release; the released defendant
should therefore be dismissed.
2.

TreatingMary Cartersas Settlements Comports with Legislative
Intent

In limiting the application of joint and several liability to situations in
which there is an actual judgment against the defendants,115 the
legislature sought to hold an entity responsible only for its proportionate
share of fault. 6 Joint and several liability is clearly the exception, not
the rule. Further, in excluding the fault of settling parties from the
amount considered joint, the legislature was apparently putting the
than on the
burden of inadequate settlement on the plaintiff, 1rather
7
remaining parties against whom judgment is entered. 1
A Mary Carter agreement, however, circumvents these intentions. It
provides the plaintiff with the security of a settlement while maintaining
the defendant's presence until judgment is reached. If that judgment
results in joint and several liability, the non-settling defendant must
shoulder the burden of any shortcomings in the amount of the
settlement. That the agreeing defendant's fault may later be determined
to be in excess of that contemplated in the agreement will be irrelevant,
because the plaintiff may recover the full amount from the non-settling
defendant.
C.

Dealingwith Mary CarterAgreements PurportingNot To Be
Settlements

Recitals within a Mary Carter that it is not to be construed as a
settlement, that the defendant is not to be released, or that it is not

115. See supranote 76 and accompanying text; Washburn v. Beatt Equip. Co., 120 Wash. 2d 246,
293-96, 840 P.2d 860, 885-89 (1992). When parties were acting in concert or when a person was
acting as an agent or servant of the other party, there is no judgment requirement. Wash. Rev. Code
§ 4.22.070(l)(a).
116. Washburn, 120 Wash. 2d at 294,840 P.2d at 886.
117. Id. at 299, 840 P.2d at 888-89. The Washington Supreme Court has argued that the plaintiff
bears the risk of an adverse settlement when liability is several only because of uncertainty about the
ultimate recovery following trial. The uncertainty built into the general rule of several liability,
combined with the fact that the plaintiff often will not know whether it will be at fault until the end
of the trial, indicated to the court that the legislature did not intend to burden non-settling parties
with the effects of a plaintiff's settlement. Id. (citing Thomas Harris, Washington's 1986 Tort
Reform Act: PartialTort Settlements After the Demise of Joint and Several Liability, 22 Gonz. L.
Rev. 67, 82 (1986-87)).
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intended as a covenant not to execute should not prevent a court from
identifying the agreement for what it is: a settlement of the plaintiff's
claim. Washington courts, in similarly attempting to distinguish between
releases and covenants not to sue, have consistently held that the court
will look to the true nature of the agreement rather than to the language
of the contract itself."' Courts should similarly treat a Mary Carter
agreement as a settlement or release despite any recitals within the
agreement to the contrary. 1 9
Finally, courts should treat Mary Carter agreements as settlements
whether or not money has actually changed hands between the plaintiff
and settling defendant. The issue arises under an agreement such as a
loan receipt, 2 ' in which the defendant turns money over to the plaintiff
prior to judgment instead of merely guaranteeing the sum.'
The
defendant will receive reimbursement in the event of sufficient recovery
against the non-settling defendant. The crucial point is that, whether or
not money has actually changed hands, the settling defendant has made
an unconditional promise to provide the sum, and the plaintiff is
guaranteed at least that amount regardless of the outcome of trial. 2
While the fact that money has changed hands may provide direct
evidence that the agreement is in fact unconditional, 23 a true Mary Carter
will always involve the unconditional promise. Courts in Washington
should therefore not hesitate to identify them as settlements, whether or
not the plaintiff has received funds prior to trial.
D.

Benefits of TreatingMary CarterAgreement a, Settlement and
Dismissing the Agreeing Defendant

The benefits of dismissing the defendant are many. The plaintiff may
no longer obtain the underhanded assistance at trial -thatit initially sought
to purchase through the Mary Carter agreement. This eliminates the
118. See Haney v. Cheatham, 8 Wash. 2d 310, 111 P.2d 1003 (1941); Hargreaves v. American
Flyers Airline Corp., 6 Wash. App. 508, 511, 494 P.2d 229, 231 (1972) ("Appellate courts have
ignored the stated intent of the parties ... if it is clear from the surromding circumstances that the
actual intent was other than as stated.").
119. Peck, Tea Leaves, supra note 72, at 344.
120. See, e.g., Jensen v. Beaird, 40 Wash. App. 1, 696 P.2d 612 (1985).
121. See Entman, supranote 1, at 522-23.

122. Id. at 544-45.
123. See Cullen v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry., 507 P.2d 353 (Kan. 1973) (where parties
had entered a loan receipt-type agreement, court held the agreement to be a conventional,
unconditional settlement; money paid was treated as a credit to subscquent judgment against nonsettling defendant). See also Entman, supra note 1, at 544.
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potential for skewing the adversarial process. While most courts
recognize this problem, the majority have attempted to deal with it by
providing limiting instructions, balancing procedural advantages, and
disclosing the agreement.124 The success of such measures is debatable,
as argued by some courts and commentators." z Removing the defendant
achieves the purpose of ensuring trial fairness126 while avoiding debates
as to the propriety of disclosing the agreement and sufficiency of
balancing measures. While the Cox court adopted this measure based
primarily on public policy grounds,'2 7 Washington courts may effectively
do so by viewing Mary Carters as final settlements.'28
Once the agreeing defendant is removed, the trial may produce a
judgment free from collusive influence. The settling defendant's fault
will still be determined by the trier of fact, but without the bias of that
party's tainted input. Because the settling defendant's real interest is
against the interest of the non-settling party, some courts have apparently
allowed the agreeing defendant to remain at trial as a plaintiff.'2 9 This
approach should be precluded in Washington, however, as a settling
defendant is not permitted to maintain an action against other tortfeasors
for contribution or indemnity.130 Taking the next logical step, courts
should similarly hold void that element of the agreement guaranteeing
reimbursement to the settling defendant.
To best serve future litigants, Washington courts should unequivocally
assert that all Mary Carter agreements requiring the settling defendant to
remain at trial will be void. A firm policy will prevent piecemeal
assessment of each agreement as it might become relevant at trial,

124. See supra notes 21-23 and accompanying text.
125. See Elboar v. Smith, 845 S.W.2d 240, 249 (Tex. 1992); Scurlock Oil Co. v. Smithwick, 724
S.V.2d 1, 9-11 (Tex. 1986); supranote 28; see also Entman, supra note 1, at 563 ("The disclosure
and admission approach to controlling Mary Carter agreements has been criticized as being
insufficient to cure the prejudice to the nonsettling defendant.").
126. Entman argues that dismissing the settling defendant eliminates trial prejudice by removing
an attorney from trial who may use jury selection, examination of witnesses and jury arguments to
the plaintiff's advantage. Entman, supra note 1, at 564; see also Miller, supra note 101, at 800
("dismissing the settling defendant will frustrate the collusive intentions of the agreeing parties").
127. See supranote 38 and accompanying text.
128. Dismissing the defendant under such conditions involves reasoning similar to that used in the
Shelby case, in which the court held that dismissal of the settling defendant, who no longer was party
to a justiciable issue, was proper to avoid a misuse of evidence by the jury. See supranote 104.
129. See Entman, supra note 1, at 563 n.235.
130. See supranote 76 and accompanying text
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thereby avoiding wasted time and energy. Ideally, parties will abandon
this particular device in favor of traditional, acceptable settlements.!'
IV. CONCLUSION
Mary Carter agreements distort the traditional aspects of litigation to
such an extent that they are simply incompatible with the adversarial
process. Practices for limiting their impact are insufficient; eliminating
them completely is a more practical approach, and comports with the
current state of Washington tort law. Treating Mary Carters as outright
settlements and dismissing the agreeing defendant from trial is a logical
method to achieve this result.

131. There is a clear potential for collusion in litigation that may escape the court's eye. It is
conceivable that Mary Carter-type agreements may be made tacitly, with nothing more than oral
confirmation. Such a possibility suggests that the current provision for joint and several liability
should be reworked, perhaps by requiring that a defendant be at least 30 to 40 percent at fault before
joint and several liability will apply.
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